http://www.wikileaks-kr.org/news/articleView.html?idxno=16368
1980년 한국의 위기 상황 속에서 두 사람은 동맹인 한국에 대해 오만하고 할 말을 잃게 만들 정도의 무시를 보여줬다. 홀브루크와 브레진스키는 한국군에 대해 깊은 의혹을 갖고 있던 카터에게 한국 문제의 유일한 대안은 한국 국민들의 민주주의 열망을 엎고 전두환을 지지하는 것이라고 설득하는 데 있어 중요한 역할을 했다. 어떤 면에서 광주 사태는 동아시아에서의 미국의 냉전 패권 종료와 미국과 아시아의 관계의 전환을 보여주는 것이다. 군을 지원해주기로 한 카터의 결정은 많은 한국인들과 아시아인들에게 비극적이고 이해할 수 없는 배신이 됐다. 찰머스 존슨은 2001년 그의 예지적인 명작 <역류 Blowback>에서 이 점을 명시하면서, 내 문서들을 광범위하게 인용했다.
1956년 여름 헝가리 독립을 억압하면서 소련군이 무자비한 얼굴을 세상에 보여준 것처럼, 군 권력자 전두환과 그의 지지자들을 미국이 지원한 것은 미국의 소위 인권과 법치에 대한 약속의 실체가 드러난 것이라고 존슨은 논쟁을 펼쳤다. 우리는 여전히 이에 대한 대가를 치르고 있다. 최근 한국 해군 구축함이 받은 공격이 북한의 소행이라는 한국의 의혹으로 한반도의 긴장이 심화되는 시점에서 왜 그렇게 많은 한국인들이 동아시아에서의 미국의 막대한 영향력을 경계하는지 명심하는 것이 중요하다.
출처 : 위키리크스한국(http://www.wikileaks-kr.org)
Tim Shorrock (born 1951) is an American writer and commentator on US foreign policy, US national security and intelligence, and East Asian politics.
https://prospect.org/features/roots-rage/
Blowback: The Cost and Consequences of the American Empire, by Chalmers Johnson. Metropolitan Books, Henry Holt and Company, 288 pages, $15.00 (paper).
His conclusions are sweeping: "I believe the profligate waste of our resources on irrelevant weapons systems and the Asia economic meltdown, as well as the continuous trail of military 'accidents' and of terrorist attacks on American installations and embassies, are all portents of a twenty-first-century crisis in America's informal empire, an empire based on the projection of military power to every corner of the world and on the use of American capital and markets to force global economic integration on our terms, at whatever costs to others."
In other words, "globalism" is just the newest euphemism, or ideological mask, for what others would call old-fashioned imperialism. Johnson asks us to view South Korea, Japan, and other Asian countries as American satellites, analogous to the Soviet Union's former client states in Eastern Europe. The United States not only exploits these countries economically, but, in his view, keeps an unnecessarily large military force in the region. The U.S. presence in South Korea consists of "37,000 combat troops occupying 65,500 acres of South Korean territory at 96 bases." Johnson devotes two chapters to explaining why South Korea has become a prime breeding ground for blowback.
He compares the 1980 uprising in Kwangju, South Korea, to the 1956 Hungarian uprising. South Korean protesters in Kwangju were put down with the help of the U.S. military, he says, in the "most notorious act of political violence in South Korea's history." The event is forever associated with the United States. What is worse, Johnson observes, everyone in Korea knows about the U.S. role, but the American people do not, since the Pentagon is still withholding information about its involvement.
For those who assume that American troops would come home if North and South Korea reunite, Johnson says, guess again. In 1998 Defense Secretary William Cohen told a Korean audience that the United States intends to keep troops in South Korea, even if North and South Korea become unified. Johnson asserts that both Japanese and Korean media viewed these remarks "as a barely veiled targeting of China as a future enemy and as a warning against the possibility that Japan might undertake a foreign policy independent of the United States."
Likewise, the U.S. military retains a significant presence in Japan. On Okinawa alone, the United States has 39 bases that occupy "20 percent of prime agricultural land." Johnson argues that the original rationale for these bases ended years, if not decades, ago. The new rationale is "stability," an amorphous concept that means little strategically.