https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/park-chung-hee-the-cia-and-the-bomb/

Park Chung Hee, the CIA, and the Bomb

CIA’s key 1978 findings

After a “careful search of all available information,” the CIA judged as of June 1978 there to be:

“No evidence that any nuclear weapons design work is underway at present.

No evidence that the South Koreans are trying to acquire a uranium enrichment capability.

No evidence of any current activity related to the acquisition of a reprocessing capability.

No evidence of stockpiling of fissile material.No evidence of work on weapons fabrication.” [10]

But, they concluded, South Koreans faced decisions in the 1978-80 period that could affect the lead time to acquisition if a decision was made later to acquire nuclear weapons. “Among the decisions that are likely to arise are those concerning whether or not to assemble a prototype and then produce in quantity a surface-to-surface missile, and what to do with the substantial investment Korea has in nuclear research personnel.” [11]

Overall, they argued, the most important factor in future nuclear decisions will be South Korea’s “perception of the reliability of the US security commitment and, conversely, the imminence of the North Korean threat.” [12] The US withdrawal from Indochina, a more activist Congress in foreign affairs, and fear that the United States might deal directly with North Korea all undermined confidence in the US commitment. [13]

It is worth noting that the CIA’s relatively relaxed interpretation of Park’s nuclear program in 1978 is contrary to the widespread rumor in South Korea that the CIA might have orchestrated his assassination on October 26, 1979, in order to put a halt to his nuclear ambitions. [14]

Park’s interest in missiles and nuclear weapons was driven first and foremost by Nixon’s shocking overture to China in 1971, undertaken without consultation with South Korea.  As of that time, Park began to doubt the sincerity of the American commitment to the South. He also worried that South Korea’s interests would be sacrificed by the great powers in the course of the United States and China adjusting to each other’s interests in concert against the Soviet Union. [15] At the same time, the South was faced with the North’s military buildup in the late sixties and early seventies and the United States was pushing hard for South Korea to arm itself (Park was in his own way simply heeding the advice of Henry Kissinger who told South Korean Foreign Minister Kim Yong-sik in February 1973, that they basically needed build to up their own military and to rely on themselves [16]).

Thus, even as South Koreans began to seriously consider the nuclear weapons option, [17] Park undertook a massive conventional arms modernization program, including the creation of a domestic arms industry, to offset the public perception of North Korea’s military superiority. [18] “From the outset,” the CIA states, “South Korean thinking about nuclear weapons has focused on a missile-delivery system.” [19]

*박정희가 미국이 시키는 대로 원폭제조를 중단 했다고 하고 

사실은 계속 했던 것 처럼 미중앙정보부도 사실은 다 알면서도 

모른 척하고 "박정희 제거 작업"을 했을 것이라고 생각 한다. 

https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25136984

1. 한국갤럽이 30일 ‘독자적 핵개발’ 찬성여론이 76.6%이라고 발표했습니다.
갤럽이 최종현학술원 의뢰로 전화면접조사한 결과입니다. 이는 갤럽의 2017년 문재인 정부 당시 조사(9월 10일)결과 ‘핵무장 찬성’60%보다 훨씬 높습니다. 당시는 북한이 ‘수소폭탄’이라고 주장한 초대형 6차 핵실험(9월3일) 직후였음을 감안하면 현재의 핵무장 여론이 더 심각해 보입니다.

2. 몇 항목을 함께 보면 여론은 더 명확해집니다.
‘북한 비핵화가 불가능하다’는 응답이 77.6%. ‘미국이 한반도 유사시 핵억지력 행사할 것인가’는 질문에 ‘그렇지 않다’가 48.7%로 ‘그렇다’ 51.3%와 큰 차이가 없었습니다. 한국의 핵개발 능력이 ‘있다’는 응답도 72.4%입니다.

By now, every politician in the world knows that South Korea has a competent capability

to develop nuclear weapons, their delivery systems, and nuclear submarines.

It is just a matter of approval by the International governing body.

In some unknown corners of South Korea, it may be in the process of being built

or maybe already ready for testing.

Who would give a damn about the percentage or Gallup poll survey?